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1. Introduction
It almost seems like the latest “hype,” the newest 
gadget one should acquire: a piece of the Moon or an-
other celestial body. Currently, in various ways and to 
varying extents private entities and persons are claim-
ing “ownership” or similar “rights” to the Moon or 
parts thereof—and the amount of relevant “sales” 
and other “deeds” is continuously growing. The issue 
thus arises as to whether “immovable property rights 
on the Moon” is a feasible legal concept—or a some-
what surreal effort to apply the concept of “estate” to 
the Moon.1 This is not the place to go into these activ-
ities or their legal ramifications in detail.2 This View-
point rather intends to argue for the need urgently to 
address this issue and the potentially far-reaching neg-
ative effects which may occur if such activities con-
tinue to go unchallenged.
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Abstract
At a time when scientific and commercial interest in the Moon is being reinvigorated it is becoming fashionable for or-
dinary individuals to “buy” plots on the lunar surface, with the “vendors” arguing that an absence of specific prohi-
bition of individual private activity in space makes such action legal. It is therefore time for the legal community to 
address this situation by investigating just how legal such activity is—and bringing their findings to the attention of 
governments. This can be done through an examination of the relationship between national law and international 
space law, of the provisions of international space law—especially Article 2 of the Outer Space Treaty—and by an-
swering any claims to private ownership of immovable property. Aside from the fact that individuals appear to be 
being duped, the pursuit of property claims on the Moon could impede future activities aimed at benefiting society.
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1 “Immovable property rights” should, from this perspective, be defined as “property rights pertaining to land.” “Immovables” are defined as 
“property which … cannot move itself, or be removed” and “refers to land and … things firmly attached thereto.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th 
edition, at 676. “Property rights” are defined as “any type of right to specific property whether it is personal or real property, tangible or intan-
gible;” Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th edition, at 1096. “Property” finally is defined as “that which belongs exclusively to one;” Black’s Law Diction-
ary, 5th edition, at 1095.
2 For an excellent oversight of the current state of affairs, see the paper of L. I. Tennen, “Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, the Status of the Moon 
and Resulting Issues,” presented at the IISL/ECSL Space Law Symposium 2004 at the Occasion of the 43rd Session of the Legal Subcommittee of 
the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, on “New Developments and the Legal Framework Covering the Exploita-
tion of the Resources of the Moon,” to be published in the Proceedings of the Forty-Seventh Colloquium on the Law of Outer Space.
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After all, the Moon has recently become the focus 
of attention once more as a consequence of the USA’s 
stated intentions to go back there and beyond to Mars. 
At the same time, private and commercial interests in 
sending unmanned spacecraft to the Moon with the aim 
of roving for, and if possible excavating, valuable min-
erals are gaining ground. Finally, in relation to such 
plans a few individual experts have tried to develop 
arguments in favor of the admissibility of private im-
movable property rights with regard to the Moon. So 
far, by and large, governments have not tended to take 
these somewhat surreal developments very seriously. 
Nevertheless, some major legal question arise as a con-
sequence, in particular, of Article II of the 1967 Outer 
Space Treaty,3 providing for a prohibition of “national 
appropriation” of outer space or any part thereof, but 
also of the 1979 Moon Agreement.4
With the growing number of “buyers” of plots on 
the Moon, it is possible that “ownership” of a part of the 
Moon, while maybe a joke to well-informed space law-
yers or others with proper intuition, will be taken seri-
ously by a large number of buyers and lead to conflicts 
with prospective private ventures. Further to this, ques-
tions might arise as to whether the current legal regime 
applicable to the Moon might show major gaps or un-
certainties, where closing or clarifying them would al-
leviate the risk of legal disputes arising on immovable 
property rights with respect to the Moon. As a conse-
quence, it is high time not only to investigate in detail 
what legal merits, if any, such claims might have;5 but 
also, and in particular, to raise the awareness of the rele-
vant government and other authorities to the appropri-
ateness of taking counter-actions against such activities, 
to serve both legal certainty and the future beneficial de-
velopment of space activities focused on the Moon and 
other celestial bodies.
2. Facts and claims made
First a few words on the underlying facts. In 1980 an 
“entrepreneur” registered his “claim” to the Moon with 
relevant local authorities in conformity with general 
procedures applicable to immovable property, appar-
ently with success. With no one coming forward with 
a stronger claim in the statutory period after the regis-
tration of that claim, he considered himself to “own” 
the Moon as a piece of real estate. In the following 
years, based upon this purported “ownership” of the 
Moon as real estate, he started “selling” plots through a 
company.
Apparently, he was very successful; it is claimed that 
tens of thousands of “customers” “bought” plots of the 
Moon, and he purportedly became a multimillionaire in 
this way. As a consequence the company branched out, 
both by establishing “local representatives” called “am-
bassadors” in other countries and by extending the pos-
sibility to “buy” real estate to other celestial bodies in 
the solar system.
This commercially successful example invited a fol-
lowing. Thus, in 1996 a pensioner in another country 
claimed that he owned the Moon, based upon an inher-
ited claim from a predecessor centuries earlier, and tried 
to get his government to take action at the diplomatic 
level against the other government and the company in-
volved. Also, in yet another state, at one point a claim 
was brought before the courts regarding purported vio-
lation of ownership over Mars, and several others tried 
to sell some sort of ownership or rights over the Moon 
in competition with the first company.
Once confronted with various statements from aca-
demic circles announcing that these “claims” to owner-
ship of the Moon and celestial bodies might run coun-
ter to international space law, the “entrepreneur” 
essentially used two legal arguments to defend himself 
against these accusations. As few governments have so 
far taken the trouble of formally dissecting and refut-
ing those arguments, it is necessary to briefly summa-
rize them here. (N.B. the messages and advertisements 
posted on the relevant websites have been toned down 
over the years. It seems escape routes have been created 
by the responsible persons to avoid certain customer 
claims if “deeds” are found out to be worth little more 
than the paper they are written on. Even so, it is appro-
priate and useful to scrutinize the legal validity of these 
arguments in order to ensure that non-space law experts 
understand the extent or absence of such legal validity.)
The first argument was that the “entrepreneur” had 
explicitly and in writing drawn the attention of the UN 
Secretary-General, the President of the USA and the Pres-
ident of the USSR to his intention to start selling plots on 
the Moon, thus allowing them to protest if they felt that 
such a sale was not appropriate, legal or feasible. From 
the absence of answers he concluded that these officials 
had no legal questions about his claim, and therefore in 
turn that his claim was legal and held true.
The second argument was based upon a particu-
lar reading of the Outer Space Treaty, notably Article 
3 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies (hereafter Outer Space Treaty), London/Moscow/Washington, done January 27, 1967, entered into force October 10, 1967; 610 UNTS 205; 
TIAS 6347; 18 UST 2410; UKTS 1968 No. 10; Cmnd. 3198; ATS 1967 No. 24; 6 ILM 386 (1967). The Outer Space Treaty as per January 1, 2003 had 
98 states parties, and a further 27 signatory states.
4 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (hereafter Moon Agreement), New York, done December 
18, 1979, entered into force July 11, 1984; 1363 UNTS 3; ATS 1986 No. 14; 18 ILM 1434 (1979).
5 It may be pointed out that the International Institute of Space Law (IISL) is planning to launch an extensive effort to broaden and deepen the dis-
cussion on these issues soon; for up-to-date information visit the IISL website at http://www.iafastro-iisl.com/ 
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II, which states that “Outer space, including the Moon 
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national ap-
propriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or 
occupation, or by any other means.” As Article II only 
referred to national appropriation, i.e. appropriation 
“by a state,” he argued that, a contrario, private appro-
priation should be deemed allowable under the Outer 
Space Treaty.
3. Towards a legal analysis
3.1. Introduction
Before any more substantial legal analysis two pre-
liminary remarks are due. First, the case referred to is 
only the most visible manifestation of the issue of pri-
vate immovable property rights in outer space, and this 
case therefore merely constitutes the most topical illus-
tration of the underlying issues. Second, as already indi-
cated above, these issues do not just relate to the case of 
the Moon, but essentially to all other celestial bodies (at 
least those in the solar system, but until further notice 
quite likely also those outside it).
Substantive analysis of any claim to rightful own-
ership of the Moon as real estate from a legal perspec-
tive would have to be undertaken in the following or-
der, which is presented here as a summary of the main 
thrust of any such relevant argumentation.
First, it would be necessary to examine the rela-
tionship between national law (without further re-
search regarding the extent this has actually occurred, 
it is obvious that at face value national law might al-
low for an original private claim to be honored) and 
international space law (from which the main argu-
ments against such claims have been derived). Then, 
a brief analysis of relevant provisions under interna-
tional space law, in particular the Outer Space Treaty, 
on the particular issue of immovable property rights 
on the Moon and other celestial bodies would be due. 
By doing this it would be possible to answer the spe-
cific claims made, as well as similar ones by others, 
and to infer the consequences following from such 
conclusions. Finally, one would arrive at an evalua-
tion of how to view the events that may occur in prac-
tical terms and the consequences to be drawn there-
from. Taking the above as a road-map for any further 
analysis, a number of important clues to any defini-
tive analysis and set of conclusions can already be dis-
cerned, as discussed below.
3.2. The relationship between national law and 
international space law 
As to the relationship between national law and in-
ternational law, it should immediately be asserted that 
international space law, including the United Nations 
Space Treaties and—to the extent that they reflect cus-
tomary law—Declarations of Principles by way of 
United Nations General Assembly resolutions, forms 
part of public international law.6 The general issue of 
the relationship between international and national law 
with all its ramifications is complex and multifaceted. 
It will be dealt with here only in the broadest of terms. 
The point of departure in dealing with this issue is that, 
once a rule at the international level applies to a partic-
ular state, such a rule, legally speaking, cannot be sim-
ply set aside or ignored at the national level. Whether 
implementation of international law in the national law 
of a given state proceeds through incorporation, trans-
formation or direct application, the conformity between 
the relevant provisions of international law and national 
law is always in the interest of the state, for it is a basic 
tenet of general international law that a state may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justifica-
tion for its failure to fulfill its international obligations. 
This tenet is reflected in Article 27 of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties,7 in a number of Judg-
ments of the International Court of Justice as well as in 
the Draft Articles on State Responsibility of the Inter-
national Law Commission.8 Thus, by failing to take all 
measures to ensure the conformity of its national law 
with its international obligations a State may incur inter-
national responsibility.
Moreover, the principled superiority of international 
legal rules over the conflicting rules of national law is, 
in one way or another, specifically provided for in many 
national constitutions. For example, in the USA under 
Article VI of the Constitution, self-executing treaties are 
considered “the supreme law of the land.” Also, signifi-
cantly, in some of its recent Judgments and Opinions the 
International Court of Justice has addressed its rulings 
not only to the states themselves, but also to the state or-
gans (judicial and administrative), requiring them to act 
6 See also Article III, Outer Space Treaty, which provides that “States (…) shall carry on activities in the exploration and use of outer space, includ-
ing the Moon and other celestial bodies, in accordance with international law.” Thus, general public international law functions as a lex generalis 
where the lex specialis of space law itself is moot, unclear or open to conflicting interpretation.
7 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna, done May 23, 1969, entered into force  January 27, 1980; 1155 UNTS 331; UKTS 1980 No. 58; 
Cmnd. 4818; ATS 1974 No. 2; 8 ILM 679 (1969). Whilst not all states may be a party to the Convention, this clause is generally recognized to have 
codified existing customary international law.
8 See Article 3 of Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts. “The characterization of an act of a State as interna-
tionally wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same as lawful by internal 
law.” Report of the International Law Commission 2001, p. 43.
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in conformity with these rulings and international un-
dertakings of the states concerned.9
It follows from the above that, in the case at hand, it 
would not be sufficient for any purported owner of real 
estate on the Moon or elsewhere in outer space to point 
to national law to justify his claim; the crucial question to 
be answered is to what extent any national jurisdiction 
would have the right, in the absence of directly applica-
ble international rules, or international judicial decisions, 
to provide for its own applicable law on the matter.
3.3. The relevant provisions of international space law
When focusing on the substance of international 
space law, the first problem is posed by the fact that the 
issue of private property of immovable assets in outer 
space as such is not addressed by the corpus juris spati-
alis internationalis as it currently stands. There are a few 
provisions in the Outer Space Treaty and the Moon 
Agreement, which nevertheless warrant closer atten-
tion from this perspective. With respect to the latter, 
however, the fact that no major spacefaring nation is to 
be found among the limited number of parties to that 
treaty, causes the provisions of that treaty to be largely 
irrelevant in most cases.10
As for the Outer Space Treaty, firstly Article VI must 
be mentioned. This Article makes states internation-
ally responsible for any private activities in outer space 
which are deemed to constitute their respective national 
activities, as if these constituted their own activities,11 
and consequently is to authorize and continuously su-
pervise those activities. The main issue here concerns 
the inclusion of purported sales of real estate on the 
Moon in the definition of “activities in outer space” so 
as to trigger application of Article VI. While the object of 
any “sale” is obviously in outer space, the contract deal-
ing with it is concluded on earth, by contracting part-
ners both present on earth themselves as well. We will 
return to this issue below.
Further to this issue, Article IX should also be men-
tioned here, as it charges states parties to the treaty to 
undertake appropriate international consultations when 
they have reason to believe the activities in outer space 
of their nationals may cause harmful interference with 
the activities of other states. Again, the issue would be 
whether any “sale” of real estate in outer space would 
amount to “an activity (…) in outer space.”
Most relevant, of course, is Article II to which partic-
ular reference was made in efforts to defend the legality 
and applicability of claims of ownership. Article II pro-
vides for the legal status of celestial bodies, by clearly 
prohibiting public property rights over such bodies. As 
claimed, Article II indeed refers to national appropria-
tion, not to private appropriation as such, which raises 
the question of whether, in interpreting Article II,12 pri-
vate property rights would also be prohibited.
As the wording of Article II as such does not pro-
vide any further clues, one must refer to the use of the 
word “national” elsewhere in the Treaty [1].13 Most fun-
damentally, Article VI unequivocally includes “non-
governmental entities” in the scope of that term. Fur-
thermore, reference may be had to Article IX, where the 
word “nationals” de facto refers exclusively to such non-
governmental entities, i.e. natural or juridical persons. 
Thus, already the reading of national appropriation as 
excluding private expropriation does not hold; conse-
quently international space law itself does not condone 
private appropriation “by means of use or occupation, 
or by any other means,” and it is hard to see how own-
ership of immovable property on the Moon could possi-
bly square with such a prohibition.
But even for those not convinced by the above argu-
ment on its own, it should be pointed out that the pre-
cise phrasing of this Article should be seen in the light 
of the circumstances and time in which the Outer Space 
Treaty was concluded. One may question whether in 
the mid 1960s private participation in space activities 
proper, as opposed to being subcontracted to develop 
and build hardware or software, was seriously consid-
ered when drafting the treaty. At any rate, from the per-
spective of a systematic interpretation the Outer Space 
Treaty nowhere makes explicit reference to private com-
9 See for example, Difference relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights. Advisory 
Opinion, April 29, 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 62; LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America), Request for the indication of provisional mea-
sures, Order of March 3, 1999, I.C.J. Reports 1999 (I), p. 16.
10 In fact, as it happens that precisely those provisions in the Moon Agreement which are most pertinent to the issue of private immovable prop-
erty rights on the Moon and other celestial bodies (i.e. those of Article 11) were highly controversial, provisions causing most space-faring states 
not to sign or ratify, one might wonder whether this would not serve as an a contrario-argument in the case of non-parties as to any suggested 
applicability of the specific rules and principles provided in the Moon Agreement, to the extent of course these would deviate from those found 
in the Outer Space Treaty.
11 There is no similarity to the due care-obligation applicable in general public international law, where a state may disculpate itself with respect 
to private activities conducted by its nationals and/or from its territory to the extent it can prove it had acted with due care in trying to prevent 
such activities from resulting in the violation of the rights of other states under international law, alternatively to redress the effects of such ac-
tivities afterwards.
12 In interpreting this crucial clause, reference is had to Article 31, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which interpretation of 
treaty clauses is to take place having regard to (1) the actual wording of the clause at issue, (2) the background to and history of that clause, (3) a 
systematic interpretation connecting that clause logically and sensibly to other relevant clauses, and (4) a teleological interpretation referring to 
subject and purpose of the treaty of which the clause forms part.
13 As pointed out in particular by Kerrest de Rozavel [1].
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mercial ventures, and only once (in Article VI) refers to 
“activities by non-governmental entities.” Such activi-
ties were however deemed to be subsumed completely 
under the relevant state’s international responsibility; 
private activities for the purpose of space law were fully 
equated to public activities. A prohibition of public ap-
propriation, as a consequence, would also encompass a 
prohibition on private appropriation. Also, under a tele-
ological interpretation of Article II, the object and pur-
pose of that Article is simply to exclude any exclusive 
claims to outer space or parts thereof.
In other words, the absence of any reference to pri-
vate appropriation was just one manifestation of the ab-
sence of references to private parties, and not a specific 
exception to a general rule. It cannot therefore serve to 
defend the position that such a reference was deliber-
ately left out to allow for private appropriation.
In view moreover of the comprehensive interna-
tional responsibility of states for private national space 
activities, the conclusion to be drawn from the pre-
cise formulation of Article II should be that, with the 
scope of space activities now expanding into the pri-
vate realm, the applicable international space law rules 
must also expand concurrently into that private realm. 
The duty of authorization and continuing supervision 
over private space activities, as well as the principled 
absence of the possibility of any individual state deter-
mining the rules in outer space, and hence also deter-
mining whether private activities should be allowed or 
not, would further support such a conclusion.
The next issue concerns the qualification of “sales” of 
real estate in outer space as “activities in outer space,” 
with a view to triggering application of Articles VI and 
IX of the Outer Space Treaty. Here, the specific charac-
ter of the concept “real estate” is to be taken into consid-
eration: it is crucially linked to the territory of one state 
or another. It would therefore be rather difficult to ar-
gue that “contracts” on the “sale” of outer space “real 
estate” do not constitute a space activity merely because 
the contract as such is a terrestrial affair.
Certainly no one would argue that a contract on the 
sale of real estate on Dutch territory not concluded in 
accordance with Dutch law could be valid simply be-
cause the two contracting partners were not Dutch na-
tionals or residents and concluded the contract outside 
the Netherlands. Hence, by analogy such contracts on 
“real estate” in outer space should be deemed to con-
stitute space activities in the sense of Articles VI and IX 
of the Outer Space Treaty, leading to application of the 
provisions contained therein.
This brings our analysis to the next stage. Since outer 
space is not subject to national jurisdiction and territo-
rial sovereignty, prima facie it might perhaps be argued 
that outer space differs precisely on this point from 
(here) the Netherlands, and that, as a consequence of the 
fact that no national law is applicable on a territorial ba-
sis, a contract signed elsewhere on “real estate” would 
a contrario be legally valid. However, such an argument 
overlooks the fundamental character of “real estate” as 
being tied to one territorial jurisdiction or other. Owner-
ship over immovable property is not a self-evident phe-
nomenon, defined by natural law or divine intervention; 
it is a concept provided for by national laws which each 
elaborate it in their own fashion.14 For example, how a 
private person can come to own real estate,15 what his 
rights and obligations are in respect of such real estate,16 
and how he can be disowned in case of overriding pub-
lic interests,17 are all determined by the relevant national 
law—and this often in quite different fashion.
In view of the fundamental ties of real estate to ter-
ritory, and in the international legal sense too, such 
national laws apply exclusively on a territorial basis. 
Dutch laws on private ownership of immovable prop-
erty apply to Dutch territory; US laws to US territory, 
and so on. In other words, national law, and any claim 
based upon registration under it, is irrelevant with re-
spect to determining possible private ownership of “real 
estate” on the Moon.18
In conclusion, by excluding “national appropria-
tion” Article II of the Outer Space Treaty precludes both 
private appropriation in itself as being covered by that 
term, and the application of any sovereignty and na-
tional legislation on a territorial basis. Hence, no na-
tional laws allowing for private appropriation could 
ever apply to the Moon or other celestial bodies.
3.4. Answering any claims to private ownership of 
immovable property
From the above analysis, direct answers to the claims 
being put forward are now also possible, and arise as 
follows.
On the first claim, of consent by silence of a few po-
litical authorities, this should be discarded since nei-
ther of the two presidents, nor even the UN Secretary-
General, would have had the authority in the first place 
14 It may be pointed out in this context that under the old communist legal system in the Soviet Union and its allies it was legally impossible for a 
private person to own any immovable property at all. 
15 E.g. by means of depositing a claim which goes unchallenged for a specified period of time, or by means of inheriting a relevant document from 
a forefather.
16 E.g. as to valuable minerals or historical treasures found on one’s immovable property; cf. also the concepts of “right of way” or “private pas-
sage” sometimes resting upon real estate or parts thereof.
17 E.g. when a high-speed railway line or motorway needs to be built; including rules on procedures and entitlement to compensation.
18 Reference is again to be had to Art. 27, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (see supra, at n. 6).
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to acknowledge or deny the validity of the relevant ac-
tions.19 It is space law as such, agreed upon at the inter-
national level by all major spacefaring nations, in partic-
ular by means of the Outer Space Treaty, which already 
excludes the validity of any such claim [2].
On the second argument about the a contrario in-
terpretation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty, it 
should by now be equally clear that, whatever the pre-
cise details or merits, this too would have to be dis-
carded. Any possible validity of a claim to title over the 
Moon as “real estate” under national law cannot dis-
tract from the fact that, under Article II, such national 
law could never extend to the Moon. Under interna-
tional space law the relevant claims—and those of all of 
the “customers”—to “own” “real estate” on the Moon 
are without any validity and are in violation properly 
speaking of the Article’s core principles and rules.
Apart from claims of the same nature, two varia-
tions have been encountered so far. One variation is 
to provide a disclaimer saying that whether valid title 
can be derived from any document referring to “real 
estate” on the Moon essentially depends upon the ap-
plicable jurisdiction.20 Since it still suggests that it is 
somehow up to national jurisdictions and law to deter-
mine validity of title, this variation ignores the fact that 
on the Moon no valid jurisdiction with respect to im-
movable property rights of any state whatsoever can ap-
ply, as analyzed above.
The other variation is more ingenious, as it ac-
knowledges that no validity of title to real estate can 
currently be derived. The document of “ownership” 
instead refers to a reservation for the future occasion 
when a valid legal regime of private ownership of im-
movable property on the Moon comes to be established 
(presumably at the international level), and then in fur-
ther conformity with such regime de lege ferenda. While 
this variation has the merit of acknowledging the pres-
ent impossibility of privately holding valid title to im-
movable property on the Moon (and at the same time 
points out the desirability of at least seriously consid-
ering establishment of such a regime at the interna-
tional level21), it still entails some problems.
After all, the suggestion is that, by “buying” such a 
“reservation”, whatever the regime eventually estab-
lished, one could proceed on the assumption that such 
a “reservation” would be acknowledged and properly 
implemented by it. If this were accepted, however, the 
establishment of such a regime would be severely prej-
udiced by entities “selling” the reservations, which do 
not have any authority to co-define the future legal re-
gime of the Moon, unless these reservations were con-
sidered as devoid of any relevance as the “ownership” 
purportedly obtained under the scheme discussed. Con-
sequently, neither of the variations sketched would lead 
to claims holding true either.
3.5. Consequences of the lack of validity of any 
“ownership” claim
The conclusions thus drawn on the lack of validity 
of any “ownership” or even “reservation” claim with re-
gard to immovable property on the Moon or other ce-
lestial bodies would then lead to the following observa-
tions. The consequences essentially manifest themselves 
at two levels: nationally and internationally.
At the national level, presuming that the validity of 
claims under national law might be valid and recog-
nized, the consequences of the international—and there-
fore legal—invalidity of these claims might come to the 
fore in applicable cases. For example, imagine a citizen 
within the relevant jurisdiction “owning” real estate 
on the Moon after “buying” it from the company con-
cerned. Now imagine another company within the same 
jurisdiction, which by means of an unmanned robotic 
mission was excavating valuable minerals from this 
“real estate.” Said citizen might try to sue the latter com-
pany for trespass and claim the minerals thus excavated 
as his rightful property. Such a case could then lead to 
either of two scenarios.
Unmanned robotic missions are not a science fiction 
scenario any more; several US companies have devel-
oped serious plans for such missions. It may be further 
noted that several years ago some of these companies 
had already reached the stage of negotiating with Aus-
tralian governmental authorities to allow the return 
of their unmanned missions to take place on Austra-
lian territory. However, once these companies found 
out that Australia was a party to the Moon Agreement, 
which contains a moratorium on commercial exploita-
tion and the suggestion that a regime for such exploi-
tation, yet to be developed, would be quite strict vis-à-
vis private commercial interests, they backed off. This 
shows that such considerations risk stifling the poten-
tially beneficial commercial exploitation of the Moon 
19 Whether the authorities mentioned ever took seriously such letters—presupposing they received them in the first place as claimed—thus is not 
really relevant, though not taking them seriously might further strengthen the contention that no claim of this sort could ever be validated. As 
Sterns & Tennen succinctly put it: “States do not have any obligation to respond to claims such as Hopes, or to every other crackpot scheme.” It 
can certainly not serve as an argument for “consent by silence.”
20 It seems, that in the case concerned at some stage it was indicated that at least under Dutch law deriving valid title to real estate from the doc-
ument of “sale” upon payment might not be possible—implying, of course, valid title within other jurisdictions remained a distinct possibility.
21 This refers of course to current discussions raging also in the context of the Moon Agreement, where a regime allowing for private activities 
and private rights (including possibly rights to own immovable property) subject to certain legal requirements might go a long way to solving 
the lack of acceptance of that Agreement due to the deadlock over private and commercial use and exploitation. See also Sterns & Tennen, Priva-
teering and Profiteering.
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in the absence of a clear and generally accepted legal 
regime.)
On the one hand, a judge or court confronted with 
a case as indicated above might take the claim seri-
ously, might not be aware of the international ram-
ifications (read invalidity) of such a claim, might not 
consider contacting the relevant Department or Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and might thus, on the basis of 
papers shown which would be valid under national 
law as such, award such a claim. (Although a court 
might normally be expected to research a legal ques-
tion about the Moon and find that international law is 
applicable, the aforementioned scenario is essentially 
what happened when the original claim to ownership 
of the Moon was accepted locally in 1980.22) If a court 
were similarly to judge the claim valid since it was not 
aware that this piece of national legislation was not ap-
plicable to the Moon, and were hence at face value to 
take national law to be valid here, the defendant might 
thus find himself disappropriated, requiring appeal on 
his part invoking international space law to set the re-
cord straight.23
On the other hand, if either the judge or court in first 
instance, or on appeal did not award the claim, an is-
sue of fraud might arise: to the extent that the “owner” 
of real estate could reasonably expect that “buying” the 
“real estate” on the Moon from the selling company 
would provide him with real title over such real estate, 
he might consider himself to have been defrauded.
As such this is perhaps a matter of national jurisdic-
tion and national effect. In view, however, of the respec-
tive general ramifications of both possible outcomes at 
the international level, in particular where it concerns 
states dominant in space and private space activities, it 
should also be taken seriously at that level.
At such an international level, whatever the outcome 
of such national cases might be, the relevant state re-
mains responsible under Article VI of the Outer Space 
Treaty for the activities of nationals and national com-
panies being in conformity with the terms of the Outer 
Space Treaty and international space law more gener-
ally. Since the purported sale of “real estate” is seen to 
be in violation of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty 
generally, and any claims to the contrary must be dis-
missed, these activities are not in conformity with inter-
national space law.
Whatever emerges from further and more detailed 
legal investigations, it is hard to imagine that any pro-
longation of such activities or claims would not amount 
to a breach by the relevant state party to the Outer Space 
Treaty of its obligations under it towards all other states 
parties to it, in particular of its obligations to respect the 
non-appropriation clause of Article II and its duty to su-
pervise these activities under Article VI. Any claim that 
such further and more extended analysis would be nec-
essary before a definitive conclusion could be provided, 
would only backfire by allowing such claims to gain 
more and more apparent legitimacy. There is sufficient 
evidence is on the table to start acting now.
The fact that national courts might reach conclu-
sions in their judgments contrary to such lack of legal 
validity under Article II or under any other legal ar-
gument would not alter this conclusion; as a matter of 
fact it would not even be up to a national court to uni-
laterally interpret international treaties as to the duties 
they impose upon states parties vis-à-vis other states 
parties.
4. Conclusions
The above analysis inevitably leads to the conclu-
sion that the issue of immovable property rights on the 
Moon and other celestial bodies must be rapidly tack-
led. Any suggestion that the sale of plots of the Moon as 
if they were real estate is valid should be strongly dis-
missed: the Moon does not comprise real estate in the 
normal legal terrestrial meaning of the concept, and any 
such claims are at best surreal.
Allowing these suggestions to maintain an aura of 
legality and feasibility amounts to a breach of relevant 
obligations under the Outer Space Treaty in particular. 
Whereas this may give rise to cases of fraud at the na-
tional level, subject of course to relevant national law 
and jurisprudence, more importantly, at the interna-
tional level action should be taken to redress this situa-
tion. For the time being, it may seem a rather academic 
issue, but in view of the growing number of “sales” ini-
tiatives, this might soon change fundamentally.
One may refer in this context to such initiatives as 
undertaken within the International Law Association’s 
(ILA) Space Law Committee. At the ILA’s 70th confer-
ence in New Delhi in 2002 it discussed the issues of the 
status of the Moon and its ramifications for private and/
or commercial exploitation in quite some detail. While 
it was considered that any application of the “common 
22 The following text comes straight from the website of Lunar Embassy, the company which first started the hoax: “Well, in 1980, a very bright, 
young and handsome Mr. Dennis Hope, went to his local US Governmental Office for claim registries, the San Francisco County Seat, and made 
a claim for the entire lunar surface, as well as the surface of all the other eight planets of our solar system and their moons (except Earth and the 
sun). Obviously, he was at first taken for a crackpot, until, 3 supervisors, 2 Floors and 5 hours later, the main supervisor accepted, and registered 
his claim;” at http://www.lunarembassy.com/, under “News & FAQs,” under “General FAQ,” under Question #2, “What is the Lunar Embas-
sy’s legal basis for selling extraterrestrial properties?”
23 It may be noted, of course, that even the claim of the defendant to property over the minerals excavated might be subject to some doubts, as not 
all experts are in agreement on the interpretation of the relevant clauses of the Outer Space Treaty, or more properly the absence thereof for the 
larger part, on this particular issue. This will not however be dealt with further in the current contribution.
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heritage of mankind” principle to the Moon and its nat-
ural resources, as Article 11(1) of the Moon Agreement 
provides as far as the states parties to the Moon Agree-
ment are concerned, would not in itself exclude the pos-
sibility of private and commercial exploitation of the 
Moon and its natural resources, it also became clear that 
there was no specific legal guidance at the international 
level on the rights and obligations of both states and pri-
vate parties in that respect.
At the same time, since the Moon is not real estate 
under the present legal situation, the above analysis 
points to the need to develop a viable and fair regime 
for bona fide private participation in activities on it and 
other celestial bodies. Many private activities, whether 
commercial or otherwise, would be generally harmless 
and probably beneficial for society in general. The ab-
sence of a clear international regime dealing with these 
issues also stifles any private activities with positive and 
honorable motives. Of course, any new regime must 
take into consideration the interests of space science, 
the feasibility of actually undertaking certain activities 
on the Moon, and established interests in maintaining 
peace, security and safety in relation to space activities.
In short, whatever further legal analysis may un-
earth in terms of detailed arguments, such undertakings 
should fit in harmoniously with existing international 
space law, and this includes in particular Article II of 
the Outer Space Treaty. If we allow the surreal “claims” 
to persist, we risk outer space turning into a Wild West 
show.
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